Decision-making of a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain in the context government policy: a dynamic game theory
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Publication:782067
DOI10.1155/2020/2313698zbMath1459.91034OpenAlexW3031646605MaRDI QIDQ782067
Xuemei Zhang, Guohu Qi, Qianwen Li
Publication date: 22 July 2020
Published in: Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2020/2313698
Applications of game theory (91A80) Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Dynamic games (91A25)
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Cites Work
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