Innovation in long-term care insurance: joint contracts for mitigating relational moral hazard

DOI10.1016/J.INSMATHECO.2020.04.002zbMath1446.91075OpenAlexW3017803074MaRDI QIDQ784422

Peter Zweifel

Publication date: 3 August 2020

Published in: Insurance Mathematics \& Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.insmatheco.2020.04.002

zbMATH Keywords

long-term care insuranceinnovation in insurancejoint contractsrelational moral hazard

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Actuarial mathematics (91G05)

Cites Work

• Two-sided intergenerational moral hazard, long-term care insurance, and nursing home use
• Adverse selection, bequests, crowding out, and private demand for insurance: Evidence from the long-term care insurance market
• Long-term care insurance and bequests as instruments for shaping intergenerational relationships

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