Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2020.105036zbMath1447.91036OpenAlexW3014541001MaRDI QIDQ785519

Debasis Mishra, Tomoya Kazumura, Shigehiro Serizawa

Publication date: 7 August 2020

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105036

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessmulti-object auctionex-post revenue maximizationminimum Walrasian equilibrium price mechanismnon-quasilinear preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (5)

Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem ⋮ Multi-object auction design beyond quasi-linearity: leading examples ⋮ Egalitarian-equivalence and strategy-proofness in the object allocation problem with non-quasi-linear preferences ⋮ Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasi-linear preferences: ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects ⋮ Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity

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