Repeated delegation
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Publication:785526
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2020.105040zbMath1448.91078OpenAlexW4245475118MaRDI QIDQ785526
Elliot Lipnowski, João Daniel Palma Ramos
Publication date: 7 August 2020
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105040
Decision theory (91B06) Discrete-time games (91A50) Applications of game theory (91A80) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Principal-agent models (91B43)
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Goodwill in communication, Discounted quotas, Monotone contracts, Dynamic delegation with a persistent state, When to ask for an update: timing in strategic communication, (Not) delegating decisions to experts: the effect of uncertainty, A theory of dynamic contracting with financial constraints, On the value of repetition for communication games, Dynamic monitoring under resource constraints
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