Implementation of assortative matching under incomplete information

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2020.105054zbMath1447.91103OpenAlexW3016431487MaRDI QIDQ785531

Naomi Utgoff

Publication date: 7 August 2020

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105054

zbMATH Keywords

matchingauctionsmarket designmechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (3)

Tailored recommendations on a matching platform ⋮ Informational hold up and intermediaries ⋮ Synchronized matching with incomplete information

Cites Work

• Price discrimination and efficient matching
• On the existence of stable roommate matchings
• Matching through position auctions
• The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• Optimal Auction Design
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
• Efficient Auctions
• Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Unnamed Item

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