The scope of sequential screening with ex post participation constraints

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2020.105055zbMath1447.91088OpenAlexW3016684035MaRDI QIDQ785532

D. Kharzeev

Publication date: 7 August 2020

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d20/d2078-r3.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

sequential screeningex post participation constraintssequential contractstatic contract

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Related Items

Progressive participation, Shifting supports in Esö and Szentes (2007), Optimal selling mechanisms with buyer price search, Dynamic mechanism design on social networks, Third-degree price discrimination versus uniform pricing

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