Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2020.105068zbMath1447.91020OpenAlexW3023355240MaRDI QIDQ785539

Publication date: 7 August 2020

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105068

zbMATH Keywords

robustness incomplete information refinements higher-order beliefs subgame-perfect implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

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