Dynamic models for coordinating private and public interests in economic corruption

DOI10.1134/S1064230720010128zbMath1448.91204OpenAlexW3015116560MaRDI QIDQ786117

A. B. Usov, Guennady A. Ougolnitsky

Publication date: 12 August 2020

Published in: Journal of Computer and Systems Sciences International (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1134/s1064230720010128

zbMATH Keywords

corruptiondynamic game-theoretic modelsprivate and public interest coordination

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Mathematical economics (91B99) Public goods (91B18) Dynamic games (91A25)

Related Items (3)

Simulation Modeling of the Resource Allocation Under Economic Corruption ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Sustainability of intertwined supply networks: a game-theoretic approach

Cites Work

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• A study of differential models for hierarchical control systems via their discretization
• Optimal Control of Nonlinear Processes

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