On the frontier between possibility and impossibility theorems in social choice

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(84)90074-7zbMath0531.90002OpenAlexW1970096581MaRDI QIDQ788597

Taradas Bandyopadhyay

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(84)90074-7

zbMATH Keywords

relationsweak axiom of revealed preferenceconsistency conditionstransitive preference

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (8)

Veto theorems with expansion consistency conditions and without the weak Pareto principle ⋮ Sequential path independence and social choice ⋮ Choice procedures and power structure in social decisions ⋮ Weakly implementable social choice rules ⋮ Revealed preference and the axiomatic foundations of intransitive indifference: The case of asymmetric subrelations ⋮ Rationality, path independence, and the power structure ⋮ Weak strategy proofness: The case of nonbinary social choice functions ⋮ Pareto optimality and the decisive power structure with expansion consistency conditions

Cites Work

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• On some suggestions for having non-binary social choice functions
• Weak path independence
• Impossibility theorems without collective rationality
• Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice
• Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination
• Consistency, Rationality and Collective Choice
• Social Decision Functions and the Veto
• Some Further Results on Consistency, Rationality and Collective Choice
• Quasi-Transitivity, Rational Choice and Collective Decisions
• General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
• Rational Selection of Decision Functions

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