On the frontier between possibility and impossibility theorems in social choice
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Publication:788597
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(84)90074-7zbMath0531.90002OpenAlexW1970096581MaRDI QIDQ788597
Publication date: 1984
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(84)90074-7
Related Items (8)
Veto theorems with expansion consistency conditions and without the weak Pareto principle ⋮ Sequential path independence and social choice ⋮ Choice procedures and power structure in social decisions ⋮ Weakly implementable social choice rules ⋮ Revealed preference and the axiomatic foundations of intransitive indifference: The case of asymmetric subrelations ⋮ Rationality, path independence, and the power structure ⋮ Weak strategy proofness: The case of nonbinary social choice functions ⋮ Pareto optimality and the decisive power structure with expansion consistency conditions
Cites Work
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- Quasi-Transitivity, Rational Choice and Collective Decisions
- General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
- Rational Selection of Decision Functions
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