Coalitional manipulation and the Pareto rule
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Publication:789289
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(83)90054-6zbMath0532.90009OpenAlexW2073406568MaRDI QIDQ789289
Publication date: 1983
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(83)90054-6
Related Items (8)
Extension of an order on a set to the power set: Some further observations ⋮ On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions ⋮ Manipulation of nonimposed, nonoligarchic, nonbinary group decision rules ⋮ Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may contain ties ⋮ Manipulation of the Pareto semi-optimal rule ⋮ Threats, counter-threats and strategic manipulation for non-binary group decision rules ⋮ Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule ⋮ Weak strategy proofness: The case of nonbinary social choice functions
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