A note on allocations attainable through Nash equilibria

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(84)90066-8zbMath0532.90016OpenAlexW2047825708MaRDI QIDQ789297

Stefan Reichelstein

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(84)90066-8

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumstrategic gameefficient resource allocationsnon-cooperative equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (2)

Walrasian and constrained Walrasian correspondences and Nash implementation ⋮ Instability in the implementation of Walrasian allocations

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• On allocations attainable through Nash equilibria
• Arbitration of two-party disputes under ignorance
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
• A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
• Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions
• Myopic Versus Intertemporal Manipulation in Decentralized Planning Procedures
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
• Equilibrium points in n -person games

This page was built for publication: A note on allocations attainable through Nash equilibria