Avoiding tax avoidance: A (repeated) game-theoretic approach

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(84)90071-1zbMath0533.90022OpenAlexW2072855188MaRDI QIDQ790025

Joseph Greenberg

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(84)90071-1

zbMATH Keywords

Markov chaintax evasionstationary Nash equilibriumAudited individualsauditing schemetax avoidance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Trade models (91B60) Positional games (pursuit and evasion, etc.) (91A24)

Related Items (8)

On the evolution of compliance and regulation with tax evading agents ⋮ Dynamic incentive contracts in multiple penalty systems with no-commitment to tenure-track auditing ⋮ Environmental effectiveness of tax compliance policy in the presence of labor unions ⋮ A predator-prey economic system of tax evasion and corrupt behavior ⋮ Dynamic monitoring under resource constraints ⋮ Tax evasion by risk-averse firms in Greece: a discrete Markov-based optimization model ⋮ Separating small and big fish: The case of income tax evasion ⋮ Dynamic incentive contracts under no-commitment to periodic auditing and a non-retrospective penalty system

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