A simple auctioneerless mechanism with Walrasian properties
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Publication:790698
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(84)90077-2zbMath0534.90016OpenAlexW2015364514MaRDI QIDQ790698
Publication date: 1984
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(84)90077-2
Related Items (6)
Instability in the implementation of Walrasian allocations ⋮ The manipulability of the Shapley-value ⋮ Stability of the Groves and Ledyard mechanism ⋮ Stable implementation of Lindahl allocations ⋮ Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms ⋮ Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information
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- A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
- Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions
- Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
- Efficiency in an Atomless Economy with Fiat Money
- Approximate Efficiency of Non-Walrasian Nash Equilibria
- Stability in Noncooperative Games
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