A simple auctioneerless mechanism with Walrasian properties

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(84)90077-2zbMath0534.90016OpenAlexW2015364514MaRDI QIDQ790698

Mark Walker

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(84)90077-2

zbMATH Keywords

auctioneerless mechanismreallocation of holdingsWalrasian auctioneer

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (6)

Instability in the implementation of Walrasian allocations ⋮ The manipulability of the Shapley-value ⋮ Stability of the Groves and Ledyard mechanism ⋮ Stable implementation of Lindahl allocations ⋮ Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms ⋮ Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information

Cites Work

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• Efficiency properties of strategic market games: An axiomatic approach
• Complete stability of noncooperative games
• Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
• Stability of the Gradient Process in n-Person Games
• Are Groves-Ledyard Equilibria Attainable?
• A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
• Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions
• Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
• Efficiency in an Atomless Economy with Fiat Money
• Approximate Efficiency of Non-Walrasian Nash Equilibria
• Stability in Noncooperative Games

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