Balancedness, nonemptiness of the core and the existence of a majority equilibrium

DOI10.1007/BF01769816zbMath0537.90004MaRDI QIDQ792856

Joseph Greenberg, Shlomo Weber

Publication date: 1984

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

coresocial choicevoting gamesbalanced gameswinning coalitionsmajority equilibriumnonemptiness result

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (3)

How bad can a voting locating be ⋮ A note on balancedness and nonemptiness of the core in voting games ⋮ The stability set of voting games: Classification and genericity results

Cites Work

• Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives
• The Core of an N Person Game
• Unnamed Item

This page was built for publication: Balancedness, nonemptiness of the core and the existence of a majority equilibrium