Cooperative games with incomplete information

DOI10.1007/BF01769817zbMath0537.90104MaRDI QIDQ792890

Roger B. Myerson

Publication date: 1984

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Nash bargaining solutionbargaining solution conceptcooperative games with incomplete informationShapley NTU valuevirtual utility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items

Bayesian cooperative choice of strategies, Equilibrium concepts in differential information economies, A generalization of the Harsanyi NTU value to games with incomplete information, From equals to despots: the dynamics of repeated decision making in partnerships with private information, An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values, A dual characterization of incentive efficiency., Solutions for bargaining games with incomplete information: general type space and action space, Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information, Interim third-party selection in bargaining, A note on the incentive compatible core, On the values of Bayesian cooperative games with sidepayments, Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values, Market games with asymmetric information: the core, Existence and properties of a value allocation for an economy with differential information, On abstract economies with an arbitrary set of players and action sets in locally-convex topological vector spaces, Bounded rational learning in differential information economies: Core and value, COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: SOME OPEN PROBLEMS, Values for cooperative games with incomplete information: an eloquent example, Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey.

Cites Work

• A generalization of Brouwer's fixed point theorem
• The Bargaining Problem
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
• On the Existence and Interpretation of Value Allocation
• Values for Games without Sidepayments: Some Difficulties with Current Concepts
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information
• A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game
• Two-Person Cooperative Games