Intertemporal incentive allocation in simple hierarchies

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(84)90088-XzbMath0541.90063OpenAlexW2042526254MaRDI QIDQ794922

N. E. Zubov

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(84)90088-x

zbMATH Keywords

incentiveshierarchical coordinationprincipal-agent problemorganization theoryequilibrium stateoptimal sequence of intertemporal allocationsubordinate members

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical systems (93A13) Operations research and management science (90B99)

Cites Work

• Elements for a Theory of Teams
• Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship
• Necessary Conditions for Optimal Control Problems with Infinite Horizons
• Pour une extension du principe du maximum de Pontrjagin
• A Formal Theory of the Employment Relationship
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