Dominance solvability and Cournot stability
From MaRDI portal
Publication:794934
DOI10.1016/0165-4896(84)90090-8zbMath0541.90098OpenAlexW2007599826MaRDI QIDQ794934
Publication date: 1984
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(84)90090-8
global stabilitynormal form gamesmarket structure theoryCournot tatonnement processCournot-oligopoly modeldominance-solvabilitysingle-valued best reply functions
Related Items (39)
Nash equilibrium uniqueness in nice games with isotone best replies ⋮ On the relationship between uniqueness and stability in sum-aggregative, symmetric and general differentiable games ⋮ Estimation of quantity games in the presence of indivisibilities and heterogeneous firms ⋮ A differentiable characterization of local contractions on Banach spaces ⋮ A NOTE ON THE EQUIVALENCE OF RATIONALIZABILITY CONCEPTS IN GENERALIZED NICE GAMES ⋮ The evolutionary role of toughness in bargaining ⋮ The dynamic evolution of preferences ⋮ Rationalizability in general situations ⋮ The frequency of convergent games under best-response dynamics ⋮ Order independence for iterated weak dominance ⋮ Uniqueness conditions for strongly point-rationalizable solutions to games with metrizable strategy sets ⋮ Best replies and adaptive learning ⋮ Long-run dynamics of queues: Stability and chaos ⋮ Best-response dynamics in directed network games ⋮ Learning and selfconfirming equilibria in network games ⋮ Stability of the replicator equation for a single species with a multi-dimensional continuous trait space ⋮ Characterizing stability properties in games with strategic substitutes ⋮ On the existence of stable equilibria in monotone games ⋮ Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players ⋮ Cournot tâtonnement and dominance solvability in finite games ⋮ Iterated elimination procedures ⋮ ``Evolutionary selection dynamic in games: Convergence and limit properties ⋮ Voronoi languages: equilibria in cheap-talk games with high-dimensional types and few signals ⋮ An indistinguishability result on rationalizability under general preferences ⋮ Power markets with information-aware self-scheduling electric vehicles ⋮ Cournot tatonnement and potentials ⋮ Iterated strict dominance in general games ⋮ Learning in Games ⋮ Acyclicity of improvements in finite game forms ⋮ Continuously stable strategies, neighborhood superiority and two-player games with continuous strategy space ⋮ Sensitivity of equilibrium behavior to higher-order beliefs in nice games ⋮ Better-reply dynamics and global convergence to Nash equilibrium in aggregative games ⋮ Strategic games with security and potential level players ⋮ More strategies, more Nash equilibria ⋮ On the dominance solvability of large Cournot games ⋮ Rationalizability and learning in games with strategic heterogeneity ⋮ Two-person pairwise solvable games ⋮ Convergence method, properties and computational complexity for Lyapunov games ⋮ Stability of the replicator equation with continuous strategy space
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Dominance elimination procedures on finite alternative games
- Expectations and stability in oligopoly models
- Complete stability of noncooperative games
- Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
- Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium Points for Concave N-Person Games
This page was built for publication: Dominance solvability and Cournot stability
