Repeated two-player games with ruin

DOI10.1007/BF01769813zbMath0541.90103OpenAlexW2756084199MaRDI QIDQ794940

Ariel Rubinstein, Robert W. Rosenthal

Publication date: 1984

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01769813

zbMATH Keywords

Equilibrialong-run average payoff criterionpossibility of ruinrepeated two-player games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

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• An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffs
• Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
• Repeated games with absorbing states
• Optimal strategies in repeated games with incomplete information
• The Big Match

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