Incentive compatibility and informational requirements

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(84)90160-1zbMath0542.90003OpenAlexW2080061319MaRDI QIDQ795694

Stefan Reichelstein

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(84)90160-1

zbMATH Keywords

message spacedominant strategydecentralized allocation proceduresincentive compatibility constraintsinformational requirements

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (5)

The communication cost of selfishness ⋮ A lower bound on computational complexity given by revelation mechanisms ⋮ The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets ⋮ The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices ⋮ Communication requirements and strategic mechanisms for market organization

Cites Work

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• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• On the informational size of message spaces
• On the informational size of message spaces for resource allocation processes
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• Incentives in Teams
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains

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