Incentive contracting with asymmetric and imperfect precontractual knowledge

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(84)90161-3zbMath0542.90021OpenAlexW1966516819MaRDI QIDQ795703

David E. M. Sappington

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(84)90161-3

zbMATH Keywords

principalasymmetric and imperfect precontractual knowledgeefficient outcomeincentive contractingPareto optimal contractrisk-neutral agent

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Mathematical economics (91B99)

Related Items (3)

Value of communication in agencies ⋮ The design of supply contracts as a problem of delegration ⋮ Agency in a market setting

Cites Work

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• Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
• Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
• Optimal Nonuniform Prices
• Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation

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