Accepting inconsistencies from the paradoxes

DOI10.1007/BF00453017zbMath0543.03005OpenAlexW2056830452MaRDI QIDQ795816

Bradley H. Dowden

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00453017

zbMATH Keywords

non-trivialityfixed-point interpretationliar sentencemonadic predicateparadoxical sentencesPriest-interpretationsemantic closuretruth value gluts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Many-valued logic (03B50) Models with special properties (saturated, rigid, etc.) (03C50)

Related Items (5)

A note on freedom from detachment in the logic of paradox ⋮ Reasoning about truth ⋮ FDE as the One True Logic ⋮ Logic of paradox revisited ⋮ The Trivial Object and the Non-Uiviality of a Semantically Closed Theory with Descriptions

Cites Work

• Davis's formulation of Kripke's theory of truth: A correction
• The logic of paradox
• An alternate formulation of Kripke's theory of truth
• Outline of a Theory of Truth

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