Power indices in a discretely proportional representative system with a large number of voters

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(83)90049-5zbMath0546.90001OpenAlexW2038025012MaRDI QIDQ798549

Shigeo Muto

Publication date: 1983

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(83)90049-5

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley-Shubik indexBanzhaf indexpolitical systemJapanese House of Representativespower of voters

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Limit properties of power indices in a class of representative systems

Cites Work

• Multilinear Extensions of Games
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item

This page was built for publication: Power indices in a discretely proportional representative system with a large number of voters