On the inconsistency of certain axioms on solution concepts for non- cooperative games

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(84)90168-6zbMath0546.90107OpenAlexW1972416703WikidataQ114685256 ScholiaQ114685256MaRDI QIDQ798573

Dilip Abreu, David G. Pearce

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(84)90168-6

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumaxiomatic approachnoncooperative gameinconsistencysolution conceptsubgame replacement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05)

Related Items (3)

Refinements of Nash equilibrium: A critique ⋮ On the non-existence of a rationality definition for extensive games ⋮ Conditional dominance, rationalizability, and game forms

Cites Work

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• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• A solution concept for \(n\)-person noncooperative games
• A simple model of imperfect competition where 4 are few and 6 are many
• Non-cooperative games
• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
• Sequential Equilibria
• A Theory of N -Person Games with Perfect Information
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept

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