Comparison of threshold stop rules and maximum for independent nonnegative random variables

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Publication:800031

DOI10.1214/aop/1176993150zbMath0549.60036OpenAlexW1999069228MaRDI QIDQ800031

Ester Samuel-Cahn

Publication date: 1984

Published in: The Annals of Probability (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1214/aop/1176993150




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