Power structure and cardinality restrictions for Paretian social choice rules

DOI10.1007/BF00452882zbMath0549.90003OpenAlexW2246577453MaRDI QIDQ800196

Edward W. Packel

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00452882

zbMATH Keywords

prefilterstrong equilibriaacyclic majoritymultiple-valued Paretian social choice rulepreventing sets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Quasi-decisiveness, quasi-ultrafilter, and social quasi-orderings

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
• Strategic equilibria and decisive set structures for social choice mechanisms
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Consistent Voting Systems
• On Nicely Consistent Voting Systems
• Construction of Outcome Functions Guaranteeing Existence and Pareto Optimality of Nash Equilibria

This page was built for publication: Power structure and cardinality restrictions for Paretian social choice rules