Implementability via protective equilibria
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Publication:800203
DOI10.1016/0304-4068(82)90005-2zbMath0549.90009OpenAlexW2033743142MaRDI QIDQ800203
Bhaskar Dutta, Salvador Barberá
Publication date: 1982
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(82)90005-2
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Cites Work
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- Prudence versus sophistication in voting strategy
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- The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
- Stability in Voting
- Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
- Voting with Proportional Veto Power
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- On Nicely Consistent Voting Systems
- On a Difficulty in the Analysis of Strategic Voting
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
