Risk sensitivity in bargaining with more than two participants

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(84)90064-4zbMath0549.90097OpenAlexW2042187472MaRDI QIDQ800235

Lars Tyge Nielsen

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(84)90064-4

zbMATH Keywords

two-person bargainingincrease in risk aversionn-person Kalai-Smorodinsky solutionn-person Nash solutionriskless outcomes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (5)

Comparative risk aversion ⋮ The advantageous nature of risk aversion in a three-player bargaining game where acceptance of a proposal requires a simple majority ⋮ The role of risk preferences in bargaining when acceptance of a proposal requires less than unanimous approval ⋮ Misrepresentation of utilities in bargaining: Pure exchange and public good economies ⋮ Risk aversion in \(n\)-person bargaining

Cites Work

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• Guarantee structures for problems of fair division
• Utility theory based on rational probabilities
• Axiomatic models of bargaining
• The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population
• The Bargaining Problem
• Risk Aversion and Nash's Solution for Bargaining Games with Risky Outcomes
• Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
• Expected Utility and Continuity

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