Classification theorem for smooth social choice on a manifold
From MaRDI portal
Publication:800802
DOI10.1007/BF00433516zbMath0551.90002MaRDI QIDQ800802
Publication date: 1984
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
manifoldcoreclassification of voting rulesinstability dimensionsmooth social choicestructurally stable cycles
Related Items (8)
Permutation cycles and manipulation of choice functions ⋮ Structural instability of the core ⋮ The ``probability of a fit choice ⋮ On the core of voting games ⋮ A note on balancedness and nonemptiness of the core in voting games ⋮ Coalitions and Catastrophic Climate Change ⋮ The stability set of voting games: Classification and genericity results ⋮ Non-collegial simple games and the nowhere denseness of the set of preference profiles having a core
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
- Social equilibrium and cycles on compact sets
- Non-collegial simple games and the nowhere denseness of the set of preference profiles having a core
- Generic properties of simple Bergson-Samuelson welfare functions
- Pairwise symmetry conditions for voting equilibria
- Transitivity of preference on a smooth manifold of alternatives
- A further result on the core of voting games
- Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
- Cyclic sets in multidimensional voting models
- A Note about the "Nowhere Denseness" of Societies Having an Equilibrium under Majority Rule
- Existence of Equilibrium on a Manifold
- Generic Instability of Majority Rule
- Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives
- Commodity Exchanges as Gradient Processes
- Implementation of Democratic Social Choice Functions
- Constrained Plott Equilibria, Directional Equilibria and Global Cycling Sets
- Existence of a "Local" Co-operative Equilibrium in a Class of Voting Games
- Consistent Voting Systems
- Instability of Simple Dynamic Games
- Equilibrium under @a-Majority Voting
- General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
- Local Simple Games in Public Choice Mechanisms
- Majority Voting and Social Choice
- On a Class of Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule
- Minimal Topological Spaces
This page was built for publication: Classification theorem for smooth social choice on a manifold
