A power rule for social choice

DOI10.1007/BF00452881zbMath0558.90009MaRDI QIDQ802457

Rubin Saposnik

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

power rulestatus quofinite cyclesocial choice process

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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• Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination
• General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
• The Continuous Representation of a Social Preference Ordering
• On a Class of Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule
• Alternative Conditions for Social Orderings