Nonmanipulability in two dimensions

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(84)90059-3zbMath0558.90010OpenAlexW1991731552MaRDI QIDQ802458

Fred W. Roush, Kim Hang Kim

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(84)90059-3

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencygeneralized median functionsnonmanipulabilitystrategyproof social choice functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (15)

Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules: A characterization ⋮ Strategy-proofness and ``median voters ⋮ The publications of Ki Hang Kim ⋮ Spatial implementation ⋮ Optimality of the coordinate-wise median mechanism for strategyproof facility location in two dimensions ⋮ Monotonic norms and orthogonal issues in multidimensional voting ⋮ Pareto optimality, anonymity, and strategy-proofness in location problems ⋮ Truthful aggregation of budget proposals ⋮ Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability ⋮ Arrow's possibility theorem for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences ⋮ Voting on multiple issues: What to put on the ballot? ⋮ Strategy-proofness, Pareto optimality and strictly convex norms ⋮ Generalized median solutions, strategy-proofness and strictly convex norms ⋮ Range convexity, continuity, and strategy-proofness of voting schemes ⋮ Strategy-proof probabilistic mechanisms in economies with pure public goods.

Cites Work

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• Necessary and sufficient conditions for a resolution of the social choice paradox
• Properties of consistent voting systems
• Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
• Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters

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