The stability set of voting games: Classification and genericity results

DOI10.1007/BF01761071zbMath0726.90008OpenAlexW2006047365MaRDI QIDQ803010

Michel Le Breton, Maurice Salles

Publication date: 1990

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01761071

zbMATH Keywords

stability setnonemptinessvoting gameswinning coalitionsclassification results

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (14)

ON THE CHACTERISTIC NUMBERS OF VOTING GAMES ⋮ A note on the non-emptiness of the stability set when individual preferences are weak orders ⋮ The legislative calendar ⋮ Committees with farsighted voters: A new interpretation of stable sets ⋮ Bounds for the Nakamura number ⋮ Quota games and stability set of order \(d\) ⋮ Cooperation, stability and social welfare under majority rule ⋮ Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: the core without majority dissatisfaction ⋮ A core of voting games with improved foresight ⋮ On some combinatorial problems arising in the theory of voting games ⋮ Far-sightedness and the voting paradox ⋮ SOCIAL CHOICE AND COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY: VOTING GAMES AS SOCIAL AGGREGATION FUNCTIONS ⋮ Coalitional stability with a credibility constraint ⋮ The stability set as a social choice correspondence.

Cites Work

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• Gillies and Miller's Subrelations of a Relation over an Infinite Set of Alternatives: General Results and Applications to Voting Games
• Consistent Voting Systems

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