Ex ante efficient, ex post individually rational trade
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Publication:805485
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(91)90145-TzbMath0728.90025MaRDI QIDQ805485
Publication date: 1991
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
private informationbilateral tradepre-play communicationincentive compatible mechanismspayment ruletrading efficiencytrading rule
Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (6)
Efficient bilateral trade with statistically dependent beliefs ⋮ The role of commitment in bilateral trade ⋮ Implementable and ex-post IR rules in bilateral trading with discrete values ⋮ Bilateral trading with naive traders ⋮ Strategic information transmission with sender's approval ⋮ Status quo bias in bargaining: an extension of the Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem with an application to the Coase theorem.
Cites Work
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- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Efficient performance in two agent bargaining
- Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information
- Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency
- The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms
- Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
- The efficiency of linear equilibria of sealed-bid double auctions
- Efficient bilateral trade with statistically dependent beliefs
- Bargaining under Incomplete Information
- Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
- Optimal Auction Design
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
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