Learning rational expectations in a policy game

DOI10.1016/0165-1889(91)90015-SzbMath0728.90026OpenAlexW2017209816MaRDI QIDQ805487

Martin W. Cripps

Publication date: 1991

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1889(91)90015-s

zbMATH Keywords

learning rational expectations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Economic growth models (91B62) History, political science (91F10) Memory and learning in psychology (91E40)

Related Items (2)

Learnability and transparency with time inconsistent monetary policy ⋮ Simplicity versus optimality: The choice of monetary policy rules when agents must learn

Cites Work

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• Credibility and the value of information transmission in a model of monetary policy and inflation
• Changes in regime and the term structure. A note
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• Rational Expectations and Policy Credibility Following a Change in Regime
• Rational Expectations Equilibria, Learning, and Model Specification

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