Independence of the status quo? A weak and a strong impossibility result for social decisions by bargaining

DOI10.1007/BF01227017zbMath0729.90002OpenAlexW2046288082MaRDI QIDQ806650

Marlies Klemisch-Ahlert

Publication date: 1991

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01227017

zbMATH Keywords

impossibility theoremsstatus quobargaining mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

Distributive justice of bargaining and risk sensitivity ⋮ Strategic delay and endogeneous offers in bargaining games with private information

Cites Work

• Axiomatic bargaining theory on economic environments
• The Bargaining Problem
• The Nash Social Welfare Function
• Individual Monotonicity and Lexicographic Maxmin Solution
• Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
• Two-Person Cooperative Games
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item

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