An axiomatization of the weighted NTU value

DOI10.1007/BF01766425zbMath0729.90100MaRDI QIDQ806695

Richard P. McLean, Anat Levy

Publication date: 1991

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

axiomatizationnon-transferable utilityNon-symmetric generalizationsrandom order NTU valueweighted NTU value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games with infinitely many players (91A07)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• On Harsanyi's solution
• The Shapley transfer value without zero weights
• A proof that the core of an ordinal convex game is a von Neumann- Morgenstern solution
• On weighted Shapley values
• Convex games without side payments
• Super-modularity: Applications to convex games and to the greedy algorithm for LP
• Nonsymmetric Nash solutions and replications of 2-person bargaining
• Axiomatic models of bargaining
• Cores of convex games
• The Bargaining Problem
• Monotonic Solutions to General Cooperative Games
• Simultaneity of Issues and Additivity in Bargaining
• An Axiomatization of the Non-Transferable Utility Value
• An Axiomatization of Harsanyi's Nontransferable Utility Solution
• Bargaining Power, Fear of Disagreement, and Wage Settlements: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Industry
• Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
• A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information
• A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game