Can evolutionary dynamics explain free riding in experiments?
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Publication:806745
DOI10.1016/0165-1765(91)90047-OzbMath0729.90627MaRDI QIDQ806745
John H. Miller, James Andreoni
Publication date: 1991
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Problems related to evolution (92D15) Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Public goods (91B18)
Related Items (5)
Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game ⋮ Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term ⋮ Punishing free-riders: How group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics in public good games ⋮ Compliance with Social Norms as an Evolutionary Stable Equilibrium
Cites Work
- On the robustness of equilibrium refinements
- An evolutionary interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's experimental results on coordination
- Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games
- Evolutionary equilibria resistant to mutation
- On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
- The Evolution of Cooperation
- The Logic of Animal Conflict
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