On the robustness of perfect equilibrium in fixed cost sequential bargaining under an isomorphic transformation

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(91)90049-QzbMath0729.90629MaRDI QIDQ806749

Rami Zwick, Eythan Weg

Publication date: 1991

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (3)

Bargaining over a climate deal: deadline and delay ⋮ Two-person sequential bargaining behavior with exogenous breakdown ⋮ The bargaining trap

Cites Work

• Two-person bargaining behavior in fixed discounting factors games with infinite horizon
• Effects of fixed costs in two-person sequential bargaining
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model

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