Evidence of a new violation of the independence axiom

DOI10.1007/BF00057888zbMath0729.90714WikidataQ114695139 ScholiaQ114695139MaRDI QIDQ806818

Graham Loomes

Publication date: 1991

Published in: Journal of Risk and Uncertainty (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Utility theory (91B16)

Related Items (5)

Observing different orders of risk aversion ⋮ Measuring and disentangling ambiguity and confidence in the lab ⋮ Dynamic decision making: what do people do? ⋮ Dynamic decision making under ambiguity: an experimental investigation ⋮ A variational model of preference under uncertainty

Cites Work

• Some implications of a more general form of regret theory
• The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice
• The Ellsberg Paradox and Risk Aversion: An Anticipated Utility Approach
• "Expected Utility" Analysis without the Independence Axiom
• Regret in Decision Making under Uncertainty
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