All-or-nothing information control

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(91)90116-3zbMath0729.90961OpenAlexW2089746286MaRDI QIDQ807356

Tracy R. Lewis, David E. M. Sappington

Publication date: 1991

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(91)90116-3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (7)

GATHERING INFORMATION BY A PARTIALLY INFORMED AGENT ⋮ Does more information-gathering effort raise or lower the average quantity produced? ⋮ Emotional decision-makers and anomalous attitudes towards information ⋮ Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered ⋮ Contracts and productive information gathering ⋮ Ignorance in a multi-agent setting ⋮ Pessimistic information gathering

Cites Work

• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem

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