Communication requirements and strategic mechanisms for market organization

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(91)90016-MzbMath0733.90009MaRDI QIDQ810345

Bhaskar Chakravorti

Publication date: 1991

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

implementationinformational costoutcome correspondencesquasi-games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Economics of information (91B44) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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• Incentive compatibility and informational requirements
• Handbook of mathematical economics. Volume III
• The manipulability of the Shapley-value
• On allocations attainable through Nash equilibria
• Equilibrium allocations of Walrasian preference games
• Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
• The Manipulability of Resource Allocation Mechanisms
• Realization and Nash Implementation: Two Aspects of Mechanism Design
• Game Forms with Minimal Message Spaces
• Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
• Sequential Equilibria

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