On the theory of repeated games with private information. I: Anti-folk theorem without communication

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(91)90139-CzbMath0733.90086WikidataQ126297945 ScholiaQ126297945MaRDI QIDQ810388

Hitoshi Matsushima

Publication date: 1991

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

discountingrepeated games with private information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (13)

Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring ⋮ Foundation of quantum optimal transport and applications ⋮ The effect of decisions under uncertainty on imperfect monitoring games ⋮ Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring ⋮ Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring ⋮ The analogical foundations of cooperation ⋮ When (not) to publicize inspection results ⋮ Repeated Games with Complete Information ⋮ Instability of belief-free equilibria ⋮ Multimarket contact, imperfect monitoring, and implicit collusion ⋮ Moral hazard and private monitoring ⋮ A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma ⋮ Repeated games with almost-public monitoring

Cites Work

• Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
• An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria
• Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting

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