On the theory of repeated games with private information. II: Revelation through communication

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(91)90140-GzbMath0733.90087MaRDI QIDQ810389

Hitoshi Matsushima

Publication date: 1991

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

discountingrepeated games with private informationsupergame equilibria with truthful revelation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (6)

The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games ⋮ Repeated Games with Complete Information ⋮ The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs ⋮ Multimarket contact, imperfect monitoring, and implicit collusion ⋮ Private monitoring games and decisions under uncertainty ⋮ Collusion in dynamic Bertrand oligopoly with correlated private signals and communication

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
• Efficiency in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
• An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria

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