Cartel stability in a delivered pricing oligopoly
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Publication:811993
DOI10.1007/s00712-005-0150-xzbMath1108.91338OpenAlexW2093183649MaRDI QIDQ811993
Noriaki Matsushima, Toshihiro Matsumura
Publication date: 23 January 2006
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-005-0150-x
Related Items (4)
Profitable collusion on costs: a spatial model ⋮ Mixed oligopolies and collusion ⋮ Does price discrimination make collusion less likely? A delivered pricing model ⋮ Spatial price discrimination in the unidirectional Hotelling model with elastic demand
Cites Work
- Duopoly supergames with product differentiation
- Tacit collusion in a spatial model with delivered pricing
- Tacit collusion in differentiated Cournot games
- Standardization and the stability of collusion
- Does Cournot competition yield spatial agglomeration?
- On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
- Intertemporal Product Choice and Its Effects on Collusive Firm Behavior
- A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
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