Assessing success and decisiveness in voting situations

DOI10.1007/s00355-003-0298-7zbMath1100.91017OpenAlexW2067736990MaRDI QIDQ812364

Federico Valenciano, Annick Laruelle

Publication date: 23 January 2006

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-0298-7

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (32)

Success and decisiveness on proper symmetric games ⋮ Majority Efficient Representation of the Citizens in a Federal Union ⋮ The conditional Shapley-Shubik measure for ternary voting games ⋮ The prediction value ⋮ Round-robin political tournaments: abstention, truthful equilibria, and effective power ⋮ Ranking nomination rules on the basis of nominating power distributions ⋮ Ghost seats in parliaments ⋮ Why not proportional? ⋮ Computing the optimal weights in a utilitarian model of apportionment ⋮ Probabilistic power indices for voting rules with abstention ⋮ A probabilistic synopsis of binary decision rules ⋮ Strategic versus non-strategic voting power in the EU council of ministers: the consultation procedure ⋮ Bounds on the competence of a homogeneous jury ⋮ An axiomatization of success ⋮ Voting and Power ⋮ On Penrose’s Square-Root Law and Beyond ⋮ Power in the Council of the EU: organizing theory, a new index, and Brexit ⋮ An alternative model of the formation of political coalitions ⋮ Measuring voting power for dependent voters through causal models ⋮ On the meaning of Owen-Banzhaf coalitional value in voting situations ⋮ Groups can make a difference: voting power measures extended ⋮ Welfarist evaluations of decision rules under interstate utility dependencies ⋮ Power indices and minimal winning coalitions ⋮ Voting power: an information theory approach ⋮ Dynamic programming algorithms for computing power indices in weighted multi-tier games ⋮ Different Approaches to Influence Based on Social Networks and Simple Games ⋮ Voting blocs, party discipline and party formation ⋮ A model of influence in a social network ⋮ Potential, value, and coalition formation ⋮ SOME OPEN PROBLEMS IN SIMPLE GAMES ⋮ OPEN PROBLEMS IN VETO THEORY ⋮ Potential and ``Power of a collectivity to act

This page was built for publication: Assessing success and decisiveness in voting situations