Iterative Dutch combinatorial auctions

DOI10.1007/s10472-005-4687-8zbMath1123.91313OpenAlexW2088240304MaRDI QIDQ812381

Shantanu Biswas, Yadati Narahari

Publication date: 23 January 2006

Published in: Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10472-005-4687-8

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyincentive compatibilityiterative auctionscombinatorial auctionse-procuremente-sellinggeneralized Vickrey auctionsweighted set covering problemweighted set packing problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of mathematical programming (90C90) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Combinatorial games (91A46)

Related Items

Optimal multi-unit combinatorial auctions ⋮ Combinatorial auctions for electronic business

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