Auction design with costly preference elicitation
From MaRDI portal
Publication:812389
DOI10.1007/s10472-005-4692-yzbMath1123.91318OpenAlexW1970574540MaRDI QIDQ812389
Publication date: 23 January 2006
Published in: Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10472-005-4692-y
proxy agentspreference elicitationcomputational mechanism designincremental revelation principlemeta-deliberation
Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (7)
The private value single item bisection auction ⋮ Vickrey-Dutch procurement auction for multiple items ⋮ Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations ⋮ A characterization of the existence of succinct linear representation of subset-valuations ⋮ Multi-object auctions with package bidding: an experimental comparison of Vickrey and iBEA ⋮ Computational complexity of some intelligent computing systems ⋮ Combinatorial auctions for electronic business
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Competitive bidding with entry costs
- Competition and information acquisition in first price auctions
- On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects
- Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
- Principles of metareasoning
- Information and the divergence between willingness to accept and willingness to pay
- Sequential selling mechanisms
- Mid-auction information acquisition
- Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions
- The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices
- Participation costs and efficient auctions
- Models for Iterative Multiattribute Procurement Auctions
- Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
- On the Value of Competition in Procurement Auctions
- Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
- Algorithms - ESA 2003
- Algorithmic mechanism design
- Bargaining with limited computation: Deliberation equilibrium
This page was built for publication: Auction design with costly preference elicitation
