Finite horizon bargaining with outside options and threat points
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Publication:813094
DOI10.1007/s11238-004-4319-5zbMath1123.91320OpenAlexW2103180637MaRDI QIDQ813094
Publication date: 30 January 2006
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-004-4319-5
Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
- The deadline effect
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- Bargaining and Strikes
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