Policy stable states in the graph model for conflict resolution

DOI10.1007/s11238-005-2459-xzbMath1123.91306OpenAlexW2052441488WikidataQ57766978 ScholiaQ57766978MaRDI QIDQ813109

Dao-Zhi Zeng, Liping Fang, D. Marc Kilgour, Keith William Hipel

Publication date: 30 January 2006

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-005-2459-x

zbMATH Keywords

graph modelGame equilibriumpolicy equilibriumpolicy stable statestrategic conflict

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of graph theory (05C90) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Related Items (2)

Initial state stability forn-decision-maker conflicts ⋮ Generalized metarationalities in the graph model for conflict resolution

Cites Work

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• Equilibria for far-sighted players
• Backward induction is not robust: The parity problem and the uncertainty problem
• Endogenizing the order of moves in matrix games
• Equilibrium points in n -person games

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