R\&D incentives and market structure: dynamic analysis
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Publication:813376
DOI10.1007/s10957-005-2659-0zbMath1084.91028OpenAlexW2082911898MaRDI QIDQ813376
Luca Lambertini, Roberto Cellini
Publication date: 8 February 2006
Published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://amsacta.unibo.it/1503/1/497.pdf
Applications of optimal control and differential games (49N90) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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