Pairwise kidney exchange
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Publication:813943
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2005.04.004zbMath1081.92023OpenAlexW3123258615WikidataQ56564685 ScholiaQ56564685MaRDI QIDQ813943
Tayfun Sönmez, M. Utku Ünver, Alvin E. Roth
Publication date: 2 February 2006
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.04.004
matchingmarket designLorenz dominanceegalitarian mechanismGallai-Edmonds decompositionkidney exchangepriority mechanismPareto-efficient matchingsstochastic exchange
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